Due to its great efficiency and quantum resistance, public key cryptography based on Ring-LWE problem has drawn much attention in recent years. A batch of cryptanalysis works provided ever-improved security estimations for various Ring-LWE schemes, but few works discussed the security of Ring-LWE cryptography from kleptographic aspect. In this paper, we show how to embed a backdoor into a classic Ring-LWE encryption scheme so that partial bits of the plaintext are leaked to the owner of the backdoor. By theoretical analysis and experimental observations, we argue that the klepto Ring-LWE encryption scheme with such backdoor is feasible and practical.
INTRODUCTION
Kleptography, introduced by Young and Yung [1] [2] [3] [4] , is the study of exploiting cryptographic backdoors to steal information securely and subliminally. A typical klepto scheme is a black-box implementation whose output should be indistinguishable from that of the legitimate cryptosystem for anyone but the owner of the backdoor key. A klepto scheme can be designed to leak the message, the private key or the state of the pseudorandom number generator, and the attacker can decrypt the leaked information using his backdoor key. After the dramatic revelations of Edward Snowden, the cryptographic research community realized that kleptographic attack indeed had been deployed and likely used for worldwide surveillance, which rekindled the interest in kleptography.
With the threat that quantum computers pose to most of the current cryptosystems, post-quantum cryptography has been gaining much attention in recent years. Due to the great performance and strong security guarantee, lattice-based cryptography is considered as a desirable quantum-safe alternative to classical schemes based on integer factorization or discrete logarithms. NTRU and LWE are two most widely used families of lattice-based cryptography. NTRU [5] is one of the earliest lattice-based schemes and has been standardized by IEEE. Through more than 20 years' study, NTRU is believed very efficient and secure. However, the security of classical NTRU relies on heuristic arguments and provably secure NTRU variants [6] [7] [8] are impractical. LWE (Learning With Errors) was introduced by Regev in [9] . In terms of compactness and efficiency, Ring-LWE [10] , an algebraic variant of LWE, enjoys better popularity than usual LWE in practical applications. Moreover, Ring-LWE has been proved to be as hard as certain worst-case problems over ideal lattices, and this provides a firm theoretical grounding for the security of Ring-LWE schemes. Therefore, Ring-LWE schemes seem to reach an ideal balance between efficiency and security.
With the upcoming post-quantum cryptography standardization by the NIST, it is pressing to provide a comprehensive cryptanalysis for lattice-based cryptosystems. From the mathematical and algorithmic aspects, people have developed various attacks against lattice-based cryptosystems, such as latticereduction attacks [11, 12] and combinatorial attacks [13, 14] . All these cryptanalysis results seem to form a somewhat systematical methodology for estimating the security of lattice-based cryptography. However, from the kleptographic aspect, there are only few results related to lattice schemes. In [15] , the authors discussed a class of possible backdoors for NewHope, a Ring-LWE key exchange. As claimed in [15] , their backdoors apply to fixed public parameter and can be prevented by the 'nothingup-my-sleeve' process which is to choose the public parameter as the hash of a common universal string. In a very recent paper [16] , Kwant, Lange and Thissen targeted NTRU scheme [5] and proposed a klepto scheme with an ECC-based backdoor. Also, they discussed the impact of the NTRU backdoor and countermeasures against the klepto scheme.
In this paper, we show how to modify a classic Ring-LWE encryption scheme into a klepto scheme. The set is also based on Ring-LWE itself which makes the whole scheme accord with post-quantum setting. Our technical idea is to 'encode' a polynomial of low degree but large coefficients into a new polynomial of high degree but small coefficients. Exploiting this idea, we are able to infect the Ring-LWE ciphertext using a polynomial of small coefficients so that the infected ciphertext can be translated into a backdoor ciphertext, and at the same time the decryption would not be affected too much by this modification. By studying the backdoor theoretically and experimentally, we claim that such a klepto scheme is practical. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After some preliminaries in Section 2, we introduce our Ring-LWE encryption backdoor in Section 3. In Section 4, we analysis the impact and quality of our backdoor theoretically. In Section 5, we provide experimental results to check the quality of the backdoor. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES

Notations
For an integer q 2 ³ , we identify q  with q 0,  [ ) Ç . The ring  that we will work with is a power-of-2 cyclotomic ring, i.e.
X X 1
-for any constant c. Generally, we denote by n negl( ) as a negligible function with respect to n. We say that a probability is overwhelming if it is n 1 negl -( ). The notations log( ) · and ln( ) · represent the base 2 and natural logarithms, respectively.
We write z D ↩ when the random variable z is sampled from the distribution D, and denote by D x ( ) the probability of z x = . For a finite domain E, let U E ( ) be the uniform distribution over E. 
Kleptography
The core of a klepto scheme is a SETUP (Secretly Embedded Trapdoor with Universal Protection) that was introduced by Young and Yung in [1] . DEFINITION 2.1 (Adapted from Definition 1 in [1] ). Let C be a publicly known cryptosystem. A SETUP mechanism is an algorithmic modification made to C to get C¢ such that
• The input of C¢ agrees with the public specifications of the input of C.
• C¢ computes using the attacker's public encryption function E (and possibly other functions as well), contained within C¢.
• The attacker's private decryption function D is not contained within C¢ and is known only by the attacker.
• The output of C¢ agrees with the public specifications of the output of C. At the same time, it contains published bits (of the plaintext or user's secret key) which are easily derivable by the attacker but are otherwise hidden.
• Furthermore, the output of C and C¢ are polynomially indistinguishable to everyone (including those who have access to the code of C¢) except the attacker.
As explained in [16] , the SETUP still works well in practice even if we use a relaxed Condition 5 in which the output of C and C¢ are only required to be fairly close rather than polynomially indistinguishable, because the end user does not know the code of C¢ and often does not know the distribution of the output of C exactly. We will follow the relaxed SETUP setting later.
Gaussian measures
We denote by D s the discrete Gaussian distribution over  with deviation s.
1 Let
+ } that actually equals the so-called smoothing parameter of n  . Now we recall some basic properties of Gaussian.
LEMMA 2.1 (Adapted from Lemma 3.3 in [17] ).
LEMMA 2.3 (Adapted from Lemma 10 in [19] ). Let 
In particular, the above probability is negligible for t n log w = ( ). [10] , for certain parameters and error distribution y, both search and decision Ring-LWE problems are as hard as the worst-case approximate shortest vector problem with polynomial factor over ideal lattices. Currently, it is believed that Ring-LWE with proper parameters is against subexponential quantum attacks. We refer to [10, 20] for more details of Ring-LWE.
Ring-LWE
The Ring-LWE encryption scheme that we will discuss later was first described in [10] . The issues of parameter selection and implementation details were well-studied in [21] . We denote by RLWE n q , ,s the Ring-LWE encryption scheme specified by the tuple n q , , s ( )where n is a power of 2, q is the modulus, 2 and s is the deviation of the discrete Gaussian used as Ring-LWE error distribution. We may omit the subscripts when they are clear from the context. The ring X X 1 n   = [ ]/( + ) and the plaintext space is 2  . We list below three main algorithms, i.e. key generation, encryption and decryption:
) Î´, and the secret key is s  Î .
Choose r e e D , , 1 2 , s
ar e br e q m , , 2 . For appropriate parameters, it can be shown (see [20] 
thus we know that decryption is correct with overwhelming probability.
Assuming the hardness of Ring-LWE, it follows that the Ring-LWE encryption scheme is semantically secure and the ciphertext is pseudorandom, which was explained in [20] .
THE BACKDOOR OF RING-LWE ENCRYPTION
In this section, we will propose a modified Ring-LWE encryption scheme with a backdoor using a SETUP that is based on a smaller Ring-LWE scheme. By setting different parameters, the klepto Ring-LWE scheme leaks a different proportion of the message to the third party owning the backdoor key.
The klepto scheme is specified by two sets of parameters: the public one is n q , , s ( )determining the Ring-LWE encryption scheme and the secret one is n q , , , s t ( ¢ ¢ ¢ ) determining the Ring-LWE-based backdoor with parameter t for adjusting the proportion of leaked message. To make the backdoor workable and compact, we set n n ¢ < and n n t £ / ¢.
where n is a power of 2 and n¢ is a factor of n. We identify a polynomial and its coefficient vector.
Now we are to define two maps that will be used in encryption and decryption algorithms. The first one is that
It can be observed that ext q extends a polynomial in q ¢ ¢ to a polynomial in  of bounded infinity norm and com q compresses the first n t ¢ bits of a binary polynomial in  into a polynomial in d  . Furthermore, it is worth noting that ext q is injective and easy-to-invert, and so is com q restricted to 0, 1 0 2 In practice, the modulus q is usually chosen to be a number of special property, such as a prime congruent to 1 modulo n 2 , which leads to a faster implementation. Intuitively, the modified Ring-LWE scheme works well under proper parameters like the original Ring-LWE scheme. Further discussion will be shown in next section. We now describe three main algorithms of the klepto Ring-LWE scheme.
The public key generation algorithm is totally the same as that in Ring-LWE encryption. The kleptographic attacker generated his backdoor Ring-LWE key pair a b s , , (( ¢ ¢) ¢) and picked n t ¢ ⌊ ⌋ bits to locate the leaked message in secret and in advance. For simplicity, we will only discuss the case where t is a positive integer and the attacker targeted the first n t ¢ bits of the message. 3 The encryption algorithm is changed as follows:
There are two different decryption algorithms for the legitimate receiver and the attacker. The legitimate receiver uses his secret key s and follows the original Ring-LWE decryption. The middle term he calculated is that 
When the magnitude of p q k 
with a high probability in practice and thus the receiver recovers the message correctly in this case. For the attacker, the decryption algorithm is shown as follows:
. The backdoor discussed in [15] targets a Ring-LWE key exchange, while ours targets a Ring-LWE encryption scheme. More importantly, the backdoor in [15] modified the public parameter a as an NTRU-like public key f g / where f g , are small polynomials, while our backdoor is embedded in the implementation of encryption and never changes the public key. Indeed, the public key could be generated elsewhere and chosen to be the hash of a universal string, in which the backdoor in [15] does not work. Compared with the NTRU klepto scheme [16] , our klepto scheme is built on a totally different cryptosystem and our backdoor follows post-quantum setting rather than ECC setting. Furthermore, the parameter selection and analysis of our backdoor are quite different from that in [16] , which is shown in the next section.
ANALYSIS OF THE BACKDOOR
In this section, we are to report on the impact and quality of the backdoor in Ring-LWE encryption. More specifically, we will discuss how the backdoor parameters affect the decryption for the attacker and legitimate receiver, how much infected ciphertexts behave like uninfected ones and how middle terms in decryption behave different with respect to infected and uninfected ciphertexts.
Decryption failures for the attacker
There are two kinds of operations in backdoor decryption: inversions of ext q and com q and a modified Ring-LWE decryption. The decryption failure of backdoor decryption is 3 For different targeted bits, we only need to modify the map com q . 

. It then leads to that the probability of
where r e e e s D , , , ,
We choose n ln 2 1 1 2 
with negligible probability. Consequently, when
the probability P attacker is negligible, which implies that the attacker recovers correctly all targeted bits of message with overwhelming probability.
Decryption failures for the legitimate receiver
In the klepto Ring-LWE encryption scheme, the ciphertext is infected by two extra terms u D and v D , and the middle term in decryption becomes According to the definitions, we know that , 
where r e e e s D , , (1) and (2) provide quantitative parameter relations to ensure a negligible probability of decryption failures, which sets a theoretical grounding for backdoor parameter selection. However, in practice, people may choose tighter parameters to achieve better efficiency and an acceptable decryption failure rate.
Distinctions between infected and uninfected ciphertexts
Next we are to report on a few distinctions between infected and uninfected ciphertexts. We follow the notations in The Heuristic 1 can be explained by the pseudorandomness of Ring-LWE ciphertexts assuming the hardness of Ring-LWE. The Heuristic 2 is reasonable because the key generation and encryption of RLWE n q , ,s and RLWe n q , , ,
are independent, despite the fact that two plaintexts that they correspond to are strongly correlated. 
/ ) is empty. The total number of bad pairs is shown in the following lemma. 
. The total number of y z , ( ¢) corresponding to bad pairs is 
and we immediately obtain that N w p w = ( -). We now complete the proof. 
It implies that the klepto encryption terminates after few repetitions when q is sufficiently large. Now we are to compare u v , ( ) and u v , ( )by studying each of their coefficients. For i
. It is easy to verify the following facts:
• N pq w p w (3) and (4), we know that to distinguish infected and uninfected ciphertexts modulo q and p is computationally hard under the assumed hardness of Ring-LWE. In this case, the SETUP totally follows Definition 2.1. In a real scheme, q is fixed as a public parameter thus the attacker may not be able to ensure w 0 = . However, it is easy to choose q¢ such that q p k ¢ = and w p w pq ( -)  , for which infected and uninfected ciphertexts modulo q and p also seem to be indistinguishable.
Middle terms in decryption
In Section 4.3, the decryption key is not involved in distinguishing infected and uninfected ciphertexts yet. Indeed, given a legitimate decryption key, one would be able to know more information contained in the ciphertexts, for example, the middle term, i.e. [22] or some other ciphertext sanitization technique [23] is applied. However, under such setting, the schemes would be impractical. To formally confirm the indistinguishability between D M and D M given the decryption key is left as a future work. From the practical aspect, we will compare the statistics of D M and D M experimentally in the next section. Indicated by experimental results, when p is small, it is not easy to distinguish the middle terms yielded by infected and uninfected ciphertexts in practice.
PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the klepto scheme in Sage [24] and ran experiments to observe the impact of the backdoor from the aspects discussed in Section 4. . The first two tuples were discussed in [21] and [25] , respectively and claimed to provide at least 128-bits security, and the third one is adapted from the second one by decreasing the modulus like [15] . For each public parameter tuple, different backdoor parameter tuples n q , , , s t ( ¢ ¢ ¢ ) were discussed and compared. For each parameter set, we generated 100 random instances and encrypted 100 random plaintexts for each instance so that 10 000 ciphertexts were collected totally. leak more message is to increase t or n¢. For larger t, Equation (1) shows that q¢ should be increased accordingly to ensure correct decryption for attacker, which may weaken the security of the backdoor scheme, but it does not seem to increase p too much. For larger n¢, the backdoor seems more secure, but p would be increased a lot, which significantly affects the correct decryption for legitimate receivers when q is not so large. From experimental results, we also conclude that it is more convenient to add backdoors to Ring-LWE encryption scheme with very large q, because large q allows more backdoor parameter tuples for stealing different proportions of message. We also measured experimentally the closeness between infected and uninfected ciphertexts via statistical distances following the discussions in Section 4.3. We assume that all coefficients of uninfected (resp. infected) ciphertexts follow the same distribution D z (resp. D z ), and measure them together to collect more . We also assume that these n 2 ¢ values follow the same distribution denoted by D z ¢ (resp. D z ¢) when u v , ( ) is uninfected (resp. infected 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a construction of backdoor for Ring-LWE encryption scheme and study it theoretically and experimentally. As indicated by our analysis and experiments, it seems practical to modify Ring-LWE scheme into a klepto variant in such a way, especially for the scheme with large modulus. Therefore, we believe that black-box implementations of Ring-LWE cryptographic algorithms are potentially dangerous and not supposed to be accepted easily. Our analysis in Section 4 can be used for detecting such backdoors preliminarily. It would be meaningful to exploit other cryptanalysis and tools to give an elaborative backdoor detection. We leave it as future work. 
